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CASE SUMMARY 
“WHEN CAN I TASE HIM, BRO?”: 
BRYAN V. MCPHERSON AND THE 
PROPRIETY OF POLICE                       
USE OF TASERS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, over 11,500 law enforcement agencies 
are testing or using Tasers1 and other similar electric devices.2  A 
Taser’s “non-lethal” nature finds use when a firearm would not be 
prudent or reasonable but a simple verbal command would not 
suffice.  Despite a Taser’s apparent utility, news headlines 
continue to depict police officers across the country using Tasers 
inappropriately and unreasonably.  For instance, in March 2009, a 
sixteen-year-old boy died after Detroit police used a Taser on him 
when the boy fled and resisted arrest after a routine traffic stop.3  
In June 2009, a police officer in Travis County, Texas, used a 
Taser on a seventy-two-year-old great-grandmother during a 
traffic stop.4  In November 2009, a police officer in Ozark, 
 
 1 A Taser is a handheld electrical device that can deliver an electric shock to an 
individual for the purpose of immobilizing the person. 
 2 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, “LESS THAN LETHAL?” THE USE OF STUN WEAPONS IN US 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.amnesty.ca/amnestynews/upload/AMR510102008.pdf; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, STUDY OF DEATHS FOLLOWING ELECTRO MUSCULAR 
DISRUPTION:  INTERIM REPORT 1 (June 2008), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/222981.pdf. 
 3 Abbie Boudreau & Scott Bronstein, “No Excuse” for Teen’s Taser Death, Mother 
Says, CNN, May 28, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/05/28/michigan.taser.death. 
 4 J.D. Tuccille, Texas Cop Tasers Great-Grandmother, CIVIL LIBERTIES EXAMINER, 
June 2, 2009, http://www.examiner.com/x-536-Civil-Liberties-Examiner~y2009m6d2-Texas-
cop-Tasers-greatgrandmother. 
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Arkansas, used a Taser on a ten-year-old girl after she became 
unruly, combative, and eventually kicked the officer in the groin.5 
Perhaps the most well-known Taser incident — and the 
source of the infamous one-liner, “Don’t Tase Me, Bro!” — is the 
story of Andrew Meyer.  On September 17, 2007, University of 
Florida student Andrew Meyer attended an on-campus speech 
given by Massachusetts Senator John Kerry.6 Meyer was given 
permission to pose a question to Senator Kerry.7  Meyer’s inquiry 
turned into three questions.8  After his series of questions, but 
before Senator Kerry could answer, two police officers 
approached Meyer from behind and attempted to escort him out 
the door.9  Wondering why he was being arrested, Meyer 
exclaimed, “Excuse me, what are you arresting me for?”10  When 
another officer appeared on the scene, the three officers moved 
Meyer toward the back of the auditorium.11 
At the back of the auditorium, Meyer simultaneously 
attempted to move away from one of the officers who had him by 
the arms and proclaimed, “Get away from me!”12  At this point, the 
group of officers pinned Meyer to the ground by the aisle.13  A few 
moments later, when Meyer noticed one officer take out a Taser, 
he screamed, “Don’t Tase me, bro!  Don’t Tase me! I didn’t do 
anything!”14  One of the officers used the Taser on Meyer, and 
Meyer was then escorted out of the auditorium and arrested for 
resisting a police officer and disturbing the peace.15  Meyer spent 
 
 5 10-Year-Old Is Tasered by Officer in Arkansas, MSNBC, Nov. 18, 2009, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34014497/ns/us_news-life. 
 6 Monica Hesse, Aiming to Agitate, Florida Student Got a Shock, WASH. POST, Sept. 
19, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/18/AR2007091802115.html; UF Student Tasered at Kerry 
Forum (New, Complete), YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r7Qef8oPmag (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2010). 
 7 Hesse, supra note 6; UF Student Tasered at Kerry Forum (New, Complete), supra 
note 6. 
 8 Meyer asked Senator Kerry 1) why he had conceded the 2004 presidential race, 
2) why President Bush had not been impeached, and 3) whether he was a member of Yale 
secret society Skull & Bones. Hesse, supra note 6; UF Student Tasered at Kerry Forum 
(New, Complete), supra note 6. 
 9 Hesse, supra note 6; UF Student Tasered at Kerry Forum (New, Complete), supra 
note 6. 
 10 Hesse, supra note 6. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Hesse, supra note 6; UF Student Tasered at Kerry Forum (New, Complete), supra 
note 6. 
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the night in city jail and was released the following morning.16  
Meyer later apologized, and the charges against him were 
dropped.17 
This incident is illustrative of the type of heavy-handed use of 
Tasers by police officers that has raised questions about 
excessive use of force and police immunity from lawsuits in Taser 
incidents.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit directly 
addressed these issues at the end of 2009 in Bryan v. 
McPherson.18 
In Bryan, the Ninth Circuit set clear parameters as to when 
police officers can and cannot use Tasers and other similar 
electronic devices.19  The court held that the use of the Taser by 
Officer Brian McPherson upon Carl Bryan was an “intermediate 
quantum of force,”20 and this level of force can be justified only by 
strong governmental interests.21 The Ninth Circuit held that, in this 
case, the governmental interest was only minimal.22  Therefore, 
accepting Bryan’s allegations as true for purposes of Officer 
McPherson’s motion for summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the use of the Taser against Bryan was 
unreasonable and he could proceed with his legal action against 
the police officer.23 
This Case Summary begins by detailing the factual and 
procedural history of Bryan.  Next, it outlines the “reasonable use 
of force” analysis of the Ninth Circuit as applied to Tasers.  Finally, 
it concludes by briefly discussing the broad implications of Bryan, 
both for law enforcement and for every individual who may 
someday find himself or herself facing a police officer armed with 
a Taser. 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In the summer of 2005, twenty-one-year-old Carl Bryan 
planned to drive his brother across Southern California, from 
 
 16 Hesse, supra note 6. 
 17 “Don’t Tase Me, Bro” Student Won’t Be Charged, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 30, 
2007. 
 18 Bryan v. McPherson, 590 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 19 Id. 
 20 The Ninth Circuit defined “quantum of force” as the type and amount of force 
used. Bryan, 590 F.3d at 772. 
 21 Id. at 774. 
 22 Id. at 780. 
 23 Id. at 781. 
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Camarillo to Coronado.24  However, his cousin’s girlfriend 
accidentally took Bryan’s car keys with her to Los Angeles.25  So, 
before Bryan could begin his trip to Coronado, he had to make an 
early morning trek to Los Angeles to get the keys back.26  Once 
Bryan obtained his car keys, he headed toward Coronado.27  
While on Interstate 405, Bryan was stopped by the California 
Highway Patrol (CHP) for speeding, and he was issued a 
speeding ticket.28  This would not be Bryan’s only encounter with 
law enforcement that day. 
At approximately 7:30 a.m., Bryan’s vehicle crossed the 
Coronado Bridge.29  Officer McPherson of the Coronado Police 
Department was stationed at a nearby intersection to enforce 
seatbelt usage.30  Officer McPherson stepped in front of Bryan’s 
vehicle and signaled for the vehicle to stop.31  According to the 
record, Bryan forgot to put on his seatbelt after the earlier incident 
with the CHP.32  When Bryan realized why he had been stopped 
by Officer McPherson, he became increasingly angry with 
himself.33  Due to his emotional state, Bryan did not answer Officer 
McPherson’s question as to whether Bryan knew why he had 
been stopped.34 
Officer McPherson then requested Bryan to turn down his 
radio and pull his vehicle to the curb.35  Bryan complied with both 
of the requests.36  Bryan’s anger continued to increase and he hit 
his steering wheel and yelled several expletives to himself.37  
Once Bryan pulled his car to the curb and placed it in park, he 
stepped out of his vehicle.38  Once outside the vehicle, Bryan was 
approximately twenty to twenty-five feet away from Officer 
 
 24 Id. at 770. 
 25 Id. The drive from Camarillo to Los Angeles is approximately fifty-three miles.  See 
http://maps.google.com (type in “Camarillo to Los Angeles, California” and click on “Search 
Maps”) (last visited Apr. 14, 2010). 
 26 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 770. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 771. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 771. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 771. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
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McPherson, and he continued to yell expletives and gibberish at 
himself while hitting his thighs.39  Officer McPherson testified that 
he told Bryan to remain in his car, but Bryan testified that he did 
not hear any such command.40  There was also a dispute as to 
whether Bryan moved toward the officer.  Officer McPherson 
testified that Bryan took “one step” toward him, while Bryan 
testified that he did not; the physical evidence supported Bryan’s 
testimony in this point.41  However, it was undisputed that Bryan 
did not verbally threaten Officer McPherson and was not 
attempting to flee.42 
Then, without any warning, Officer McPherson shot Bryan 
with his Model X2643 Taser gun.44  A Taser probe was embedded 
in Bryan’s upper left arm, and the electrical current immobilized 
him.45  Bryan fell face first into the ground and fractured four 
teeth.46  The fall also caused several facial contusions.47   
Bryan was arrested after being taken to the hospital for 
treatment.48  Bryan was charged with violating California Penal 
Code section 148 for resisting and opposing an officer in the 
performance of his duties.49  But after a trial resulted in a hung 
jury, the state dismissed all charges against Bryan.50 
 
 
 
Bryan sued Officer McPherson, the Coronado Police 
Department, the police chief, and the City of Coronado for 
excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,51 assault and 
 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 771. 
 43 Model X26 is manufactured and sold by Taser International.  See TASER X26, 
http://taser.com/products/law/Pages/TASERX26.aspx (last visited Jan. 6th, 2010). 
 44 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 771. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 771. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. n.1. 
 50 Id. 
 51 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides as follows: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities  secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
5
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battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of 
California Civil Code section 52.1,52 failure to train, and other 
related causes of action.53  The U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of California54 granted summary judgment55 to 
the City of Coronado and the Coronado Police Department on the 
basis of qualified immunity.56  However, the district court 
determined that Officer McPherson was not entitled to qualified 
immunity.57  The district court further found that a reasonable jury 
could find for Bryan and that a reasonable officer would have 
known that using the Taser on Bryan would cause pain from the 
electrical current and cause the fall onto the asphalt.58  The district 
court concluded that it was clear to a reasonable officer that using 
a Taser on Bryan was unlawful.59 
Officer McPherson appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that 
he was entitled to qualified immunity because the “use of one 
single, properly-administered deployment of a non-deadly [T]aser 
to subdue a person behaving as violently and irrationally as Bryan 
was after Bryan repeatedly declined to follow orders is, as a 
 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought 
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial 
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was 
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any 
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be 
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Westlaw 2010). 
 52 California Civil Code section 52.1(a) provides as follows: 
If a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threats, 
intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, 
with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the 
Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney General, or any district attorney or city 
attorney may bring a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief 
in the name of the people of the State of California, in order to protect the peaceable 
exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured. An action brought by the 
Attorney General, any district attorney, or any city attorney may also seek a civil 
penalty of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000). If this civil penalty is requested, it 
shall be assessed individually against each person who is determined to have 
violated this section and the penalty shall be awarded to each individual whose 
rights under this section are determined to have been violated. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1(a) (Westlaw 2010). 
 53 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 771. 
 54 Bryan v. McPherson, 3:06-CV-01487-LAB (S.D. Cal. 2008). 
 55 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 56 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 771. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 772. 
 59 Id. 
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matter of law, reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.”60  Accordingly, Officer McPherson 
requested that the Ninth Circuit reverse the district court’s denial 
of his motion for summary judgment.61 
“Qualified immunity” is a special immunity that protects 
governmental officers from a lawsuit, as distinguished from a 
defense only to liability.62  But qualified immunity is available only 
if the governmental officer’s conduct did not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.63  The Supreme Court has stated that 
“[q]ualified immunity balances two important interests–the need to 
hold public officials accountable when they exercise power 
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, 
distraction, and liability when they perform their duties 
reasonably.”64  The Court went on to hold that “[t]he protection of 
qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government 
official’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake 
based on mixed questions of law and fact.”65 
For an officer to receive qualified immunity, a court must first 
“decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged make out a 
violation of a constitutional right.”66  Then, “if the plaintiff has 
satisfied this first step, the court must decide whether the right at 
issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged 
misconduct.”67  If the official was acting within the scope of his or 
her discretionary authority, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to 
show that the grant of qualified immunity is inappropriate.68  A 
court must grant qualified immunity to a law enforcement officer 
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the facts, when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish a constitutional 
violation, and that the illegality of the officer’s actions was “clearly 
established” at the time of the incident.69 
 
 60 Opening Brief of Appellants at 1, Bryan v. McPherson, 590 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 
2009) (No. 08-55622), 2008 WL 5410908. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009); Mattos v. Agarano, 590 F.3d 
1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 63 Callahan, 129 S. Ct. at 815. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Callahan, 129 S. Ct. at 815. 
 66 Callahan, 129 S. Ct. at 815-16. 
 67 Id. at 816. 
 68 Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 905 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 
808, 808). 
 69 Id. (citing Callahan, 129 S. Ct. at 815-16, 818). 
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III. NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit’s standard of review of a district court’s 
denial of qualified immunity is de novo.70  In evaluating the denial 
of qualified immunity by the district court, the court in Bryan 
organized its analysis around two distinct questions.71  First, the 
court, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Bryan as the 
nonmoving party, had to determine whether Officer McPherson 
employed constitutionally excessive force upon Bryan.72  If there 
was a constitutional violation, the second question was whether 
Officer McPherson violated Bryan’s clearly established rights.73  
To affirm the denial of summary judgment, the appellate court had 
to answer both questions affirmatively.74 
 
 
A. WHETHER OFFICER MCPHERSON EMPLOYED 
 CONSTITUTIONALLY EXCESSIVE FORCE 
The first question is governed by the 1989 Supreme Court 
case Graham v. Connor.75  Graham held that a citizen’s claim that 
law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of 
making a seizure of the person is to be analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.76  The Court 
 
 70 Bryan v. McPherson, 590 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 772.  For a constitutional  right to be clearly established, its 
“contours must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he 
is doing violates that right.” al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 964 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). 
 74 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 772. 
 75 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 76 The facts of Graham are as follows:   
On November 12, 1984, Graham, a diabetic, experienced an insulin reaction.  He 
asked his friend to drive him to a convenience store so he could purchase juice in an 
attempt to counteract the reaction.  When Graham entered the store, he saw a line 
at the checkout, so he decided to leave the store and ask his friend to drive him to a 
friend’s house instead.  Officer Connor of Charlotte, North Carolina, observed 
Graham enter and leave the store in a hasty manner.  Officer Connor became 
suspicious that something was amiss and followed Graham and his friend’s car.  At 
about half a mile from the store, the officer made an investigative stop.  Graham 
tried to explain that he had an insulin reaction, but the officer ordered the two people 
in the car to wait while he tried to find out what, if anything, happened at the 
convenience store.  While Officer Connor returned to the patrol car to call for 
backup, Graham got out of the car, ran around the car twice, and finally sat down on 
8
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identified a balancing test between the nature and quality of the 
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests and the 
countervailing governmental interests at stake.77 
Since the critical determination is whether the amount of force 
used in a particular seizure was “reasonable” under Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the analysis requires careful attention 
to the facts and circumstances of the case.78  Graham noted that, 
in analyzing the governmental interest involved, a court should 
consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect 
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, 
and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 
arrest by flight.”79  Graham further held that the “reasonableness” 
of the use of force must be “judged from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision 
of hindsight.”80  Hindsight is not relevant to the analysis because 
police officers are “often forced to make split-second judgments–in 
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving–
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular 
situation.”81  Finally, the objectiveness of the analysis disregards 
the police officer’s underlying intent or motivation.82 
1. Nature and Quality of the Intrusion 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of the first question by 
 
the curb, where he subsequently passed out for a brief moment.  When backup 
arrived, one of the officers rolled Graham over on the sidewalk and cuffed his hands 
tightly behind his back, ignoring the friend’s plea to get Graham some sugar.  The 
officers did not believe the friend and assumed Graham was drunk.  The officers 
lifted Graham from the ground and placed him on the hood of a patrol vehicle.  
Graham regained consciousness and asked one of the officers to check his back 
pocket for a diabetic decal.  The officer ignored his request, told Graham to “shut 
up,” and shoved Graham’s face onto the hood of the car.  Four officers grabbed 
Graham and threw him head first into the patrol car.  A friend tried to bring Graham 
some orange juice in the vehicle, but the officers refused to allow Graham to drink it.  
Finally, when Officer Connor received a report that Graham had done nothing wrong 
at the convenience store, the officers drove Graham home and released him.  
Graham sustained a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and an 
injured shoulder.  He also claimed to have developed a loud ringing in his right ear.  
Graham subsequently sued the individual officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983.  
Graham, 490 U.S. at 388-90. 
 77 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. 
 82 Id. 
9
Wu: Bryan v. McPherson
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2010
370 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
looking at the quantum of force Officer McPherson used on 
Bryan.83  Officer McPherson used the Coronado Police 
Department-issued Taser X26.84  This model uses compressed 
nitrogen to propel a pair of electrical dart-like probes toward the 
person.85  The probes are made of aluminum, and the tips of the 
probes are stainless-steel barbs.86  The probes are connected to 
the firing unit by insulated wires.87  The probes travel at a rate of 
about 160 feet per second.88 
Tasers and stun-guns are considered “non-lethal.”89  As the 
quantum of force of “non-lethal” devices varies depending on the 
type of instrument used, the court compared and contrasted 
Tasers to other non-lethal uses of force.90  For example, pepper 
spray affects only the target’s eyes or respiratory system.91  The 
pain caused by pepper spray is “intense . . . [and causes] an 
involuntary closing of the eyes, a gagging reflex, and temporary 
paralysis of the larynx.”92  In contrast, the court in Bryan noted that 
the Taser X26 delivers a far more intense, body-wide, and 
immediate pain.93  Further, a Taser will likely cause secondary 
pain when the target suddenly cannot control his or her muscles, 
resulting in a “sudden and uncontrolled fall.”94 
When Taser probes hit a person, the firing unit delivers a 
1200-volt, low-ampere electrical charge through the wires to the 
probes and into the person’s muscles.95  The electrical current 
paralyzes the person’s central nervous system and muscles 
throughout the body.96  The target becomes “limp and helpless.”97  
In addition, the target person experiences an “excruciating pain 
that radiates throughout the body.”98 
Bryan testified to the paralysis and the intense pain he 
 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Bryan v. McPherson, 590 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 773. 
 90 Id. at 774. 
 91 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 774. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 773. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 773. 
 98 Id. 
10
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experienced.99  Further, when the Taser struck Bryan, he lost 
muscular control and fell face first onto the pavement.100  He 
shattered his front four teeth and had several facial abrasions.101  
Also, one of the barbed probes remained in his body and required 
removal by a scalpel.102  Based on these facts, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the Taser X26 and similar electric devices 
constitute an “intermediate or medium, though not insignificant, 
quantum of force.”103 
2. Governmental Interest in the Use of Force 
After holding that a Taser constituted an intermediate 
quantum of force, the next step in the Ninth Circuit’s analysis was 
to determine the government’s interest in the use of that level of 
force.  As previously stated, a court should use the Graham 
factors when determining whether the government’s interest 
justifies the use of force.  The Graham factors are:  a) the severity 
of the crime at issue, b) whether the suspect poses an immediate 
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and c) whether he or 
she is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by 
flight.104  The Ninth Circuit cautioned, however, that the three 
Graham factors are not exclusive.105  Instead, this analysis must 
encompass the totality of the circumstances of each case and 
take into account factors that might not have been listed in 
Graham.106 
a. The Severity of the Crime at Issue 
Officer McPherson originally stopped Bryan for a seatbelt 
violation, a traffic infraction punishable by a fine.107  The court 
stated the general rule that “traffic violations generally will not 
support the use of a significant level of force.”108  But during the 
 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 774. 
 104 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 775.  
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 777. 
 108 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 777; Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009).  
Although the Ninth Circuit did not define what is a “significant level of force,” one can posit 
that in this context, the Ninth Circuit is saying that normally, a routine traffic stop will not 
11
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traffic stop, Officer McPherson also believed that Bryan had 
potentially committed three misdemeanors:  resisting a police 
officer,109 failure to comply with a lawful order,110 and being under 
the influence of a controlled substance.111  However, the court 
concluded that, since none of these three misdemeanors was 
inherently dangerous, there was no substantial governmental 
interest in effectuating Bryan’s arrest through the use of 
intermediate force.112 
b. Whether the Suspect Poses an Immediate Threat to the  Safety 
of the Officers or Others 
The most important Graham factor is whether the suspect 
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.113  
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that Bryan’s 
behavior was unusual, that Bryan appeared, and in fact was, 
unarmed, and that Bryan was shouting expletives and gibberish to 
himself.114  However, Bryan never directed a physical or verbal 
threat to Officer McPherson.115  At the time of the Taser incident, 
Bryan was approximately twenty feet away from the officer, and 
Bryan contended he did not advance toward Officer 
 
present a situation where the police officer would need to use a level of force to have the 
person comply with the officer’s commands. 
 109 California Penal Code section 148(a)(1) provides as follows: 
Every person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public officer, peace 
officer, or an emergency medical technician, as defined in Division 2.5 (commencing 
with Section 1797) of the Health and Safety Code, in the discharge or attempt to 
discharge any duty of his or her office or employment, when no other punishment is 
prescribed, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), 
or by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by both that fine and 
imprisonment. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 148(a)(1) (Westlaw 2010). 
 110 California Vehicle Code section 2800(a) provides as follows: 
It is unlawful to willfully fail or refuse to comply with a lawful order, signal, or direction 
of a peace officer, as defined in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 830) of Title 
3 of Part 2 of the Penal Code, when that peace officer is in uniform and is performing 
duties pursuant to any of the provisions of this code, or to refuse to submit to a 
lawful inspection pursuant to this code. 
CAL. VEH. CODE § 2800(a) (Westlaw 2010). 
 111 California Health & Safety Code section 11550(a) provides as follows: “No person 
shall use, or be under the influence of any controlled substance . . . .” CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 11550(a) (Westlaw 2010). 
 112 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 777. 
 113 Id. at 775. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
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McPherson.116  The Ninth Circuit concluded that, even if Bryan 
had taken a step toward Officer McPherson, an intermediate level 
of force would not have been justified, because Bryan would still 
have been about nineteen feet away from the officer.117   
Further, when Officer McPherson confronted Bryan, he had 
un-holstered and charged his Taser X26, thereby readying himself 
for an immediate response to any changes in the 
circumstances.118  Additionally, there was evidence that Bryan 
was actually facing away from Officer McPherson when the officer 
shot Bryan with the Taser.119  The court noted that one of the 
electrical probes was lodged in the side of Bryan’s arms rather 
than in his chest, indicating that Bryan was not directly facing 
Officer McPherson.120  Furthermore, the blood on the pavement 
indicated that Bryan fell face-first away from Officer McPherson.121  
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, not only did Bryan 
appear to be no threat to Officer McPherson, but Bryan’s behavior 
did not pose a threat to anyone else because there were no 
nearby pedestrians.122 
The Ninth Circuit distinguished the circumstances in Bryan 
from those facing the officer in the Eleventh Circuit in Draper v. 
Reynolds.123  In Draper, an officer pulled over the defendant’s 
vehicle for an alleged tag light violation.124  The officer requested 
four times that the defendant provide specific documents pursuant 
to a traffic stop.125  However, the defendant ignored all four 
requests and became increasingly belligerent.126  It was only after 
the fifth request was ignored by the “threatening” defendant that 
the officer concluded he had to discharge his Taser to protect 
himself and bring the defendant under control.127 
 
 116 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 775. 
 117 Id. at 776. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 776 n.10. 
 123 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 776; Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 124 Reynolds, 369 F.3d at 1273. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
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c. Whether the Suspect is Actively Resisting Arrest or Attempting 
To Evade Arrest by Flight 
The Ninth Circuit began the analysis of the third factor by 
cautioning that resistance is usually not purely passive or purely 
active.128  The court stated that an example of “passive resistance” 
was when protestors remained seated and ignored police orders 
to move.129  In comparison, an example of “active resistance” was 
when an arrestee swung a belt at an officer and “strenuously 
resist[ed]” as the police attempted to handcuff the individual.130  
But the court noted that, even in a situation in which an individual 
is purely passive in resistance, the use of some force upon that 
individual might be justified if the factual circumstances depict 
bellicosity toward the officer rising to the level of a threat.131 
Here, the court found Bryan’s behavior was not purely 
passive.132  Bryan shouted expletives at himself and hit his thighs 
in apparent frustration with how his day had started.133  However, 
Bryan complied with all of Officer McPherson’s commands, except 
the one to remain in the vehicle, which Bryan claimed he did not 
hear.134  The Ninth Circuit concluded that, although Bryan’s 
behavior was “bizarre,” his actions were not “bellicose” and were 
far from indicative of an intention  to engage in an active struggle 
with the officer.135  Since the reviewing court must view the facts in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that Bryan’s conduct was not enough to constitute 
resistance.136 
d. Two Additional Considerations Beyond the Graham Factors 
Aside from the three Graham factors, the Ninth Circuit 
analyzed two additional factors that supported its conclusion that 
the officer’s use of force was unreasonable.137  The first was 
Officer McPherson’s failure to warn Bryan that he would use a 
 
 128 Bryan v. McPherson, 590 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 129 Id. (citing Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 805 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 130 Id. (citing Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 776 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
 131 Id. at 779. 
 132 Id. at 778. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 779. 
 135 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 779. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
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Taser if Bryan did not remain in the car.138  The court stated that 
there appeared to have been ample time for the officer to give 
such a warning if the officer had intended to do so.139 
Second, the Ninth Circuit noted that police officers are 
required to consider alternative tactics to effectuate an arrest.140  
The alternative tactic the Ninth Circuit concluded Officer 
McPherson should have considered was the deployment of 
additional officers to control Bryan.141  The court found that Officer 
McPherson knew other officers would arrive on the scene and that 
the presence of these additional officers would likely have 
transformed the situation into one that would not require the use of 
a Taser.142  These two additional considerations significantly 
factored into the court’s Graham analysis.143  All five factors led 
the Ninth Circuit to hold that the government had, at best, a 
minimal interest in the use of force against Bryan.144 
3. Balancing the Competing Interests 
Once the court determined the level of force in the use of the 
Taser and the government’s interest in that use of force, the final 
step was to balance these two competing interests.  The court 
noted that, although Bryan’s behaviors were unusual, he never 
attempted to flee.145  He was unarmed.146  He stood by his vehicle 
about twenty feet away from the officer.147  He never advanced 
toward the officer, and evidence indicated that Bryan faced away 
from the officer.148  Bryan was simply not an immediate threat to 
anyone.149 
In addition, the court noted that Officer McPherson had his 
Taser charged and ready but he gave no warning to Bryan that he 
was going to fire his Taser for failure to comply with orders.150  
 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 780. 
 140 Although this is a factor, it is not a challenge to the well-settled principle that police 
officers need not employ the least-intrusive degree of force possible. Id. at 780 n.15. 
 141 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 780. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 780. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 780. 
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Further, Officer McPherson failed to consider the alternative tactic 
of waiting for backup before engaging Bryan.151  The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the intermediate force use by Officer McPherson 
upon Bryan was excessive compared to the governmental 
interests at stake.152 
Even though the court in Bryan recognized the realities police 
officers face when confronting real situations, and acknowledged 
that those situations can often be tense, unpredictable, and 
require near-split-second decisions, it noted that this alone does 
not give officers unchecked authority to use force.153  The court 
underscored that the relevant circumstances must be considered 
objectively, rather than from the officer’s subjective point of view, 
in performing such an analysis.154 
B. DID OFFICER MCPHERSON VIOLATE BRYAN’S CLEARLY
 ESTABLISHED RIGHTS? 
After Bryan concluded that Officer McPherson used 
constitutionally excessive force, the court next addressed the 
second question of whether “at the time of the current incident . . . 
Officer McPherson could have reasonably believed his use of the 
[T]aser against Bryan was constitutional.”155 
Here, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the facts of the case to 
illustrate that Officer McPherson should have known that the use 
of intermediate force was unjustified.156  The offense was a minor 
one.157  There was no reason to believe Bryan was armed or 
dangerous.158  Bryan was twenty feet away, and he did not 
confront or taunt Officer McPherson.159  Further, there was 
evidence that Bryan was not even facing Officer McPherson when 
Bryan was shot with the Taser.160  Therefore, the court concluded 
that Officer McPherson’s use of an intermediate amount of force 
against Bryan did not constitute a reasonable mistake of either 
 
 151 Id. at 781. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 780. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 781. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
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fact or law that would have entitled him to qualified immunity.161  
Consequently, based on the intermediate level of force from the 
Taser and the minimal governmental interest in using the Taser, 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary 
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.162 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
The Bryan court synthesized several district-court rulings that 
Tasers constituted “significant force”163 and labeled that force as 
an intermediate quantum of force.164  The court proceeded to 
weave that level of force into an application of the general 
principle of excessive-force analysis:  “[t]he force which was 
applied must be balanced against the need for that force: it is the 
need for force which is at the heart of the Graham factors.”165   
Although courts will now have to engage in a case-by-case 
determination of whether particular instances of Taser usage are 
improper and whether officers using Tasers are entitled to 
qualified immunity, Bryan makes clear that there are several 
situations where police use of a Taser is likely to be 
unconstitutional.  First, although Bryan dealt with a specific Taser 
Model, the X26, the Ninth Circuit stated its holding in broad terms 
applicable to “all controlled electric devices that cause similar 
physiological effects.”166  However, the officer used the “dart 
mode” of the Taser and fired the electrical darts at Bryan rather 
than using the less intense “stun mode.”167  Bryan left open the 
question whether the stun mode of a Taser or other similar electric 
device would be considered an intermediate quantum of force.168 
 
 161 Id. at 782. 
 162 Id. 
 163 See Sanders v. City of Fresno, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1168 (E.D. Cal. 2008); 
Beaver v. City of Fed. Way, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
 164 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 775. 
 165 Headwaters Forest Def. v. County of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 
2002) (quoting Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 976 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 166 Bryan, 590 F.3d at 772 n.2. 
 167 Id. at 772-73. 
 168 The Ninth Circuit recently decided another Taser case, Brooks v. City of Seattle, 
599 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2010).  The Ninth Circuit distinguished the stun-mode use of the 
Taser in Brooks with the dart-mode use of the Taser in Bryan, stating that there are 
“markedly different physiological effects.” Id. at 1027.  The majority concluded that the stun-
mode use of the Taser is less than an intermediate quantum of force. Id. at 1028.  But 
Circuit Judge Marsha Berzon filed a strong dissent, noting that in the Eighth Circuit, a 
single application of the drive-stun mode constituted excessive force. Id. at 1037.  Judge 
Berzon also noted that although the Eighth Circuit “explained the difference between the 
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Second, Bryan indicates that minor offenses such as 
infractions or even nonviolent misdemeanors will not likely serve 
as proper basis for Taser usage.169  Third, bizarre but non-
threatening outbursts, such as Bryan’s profanity and the hitting of 
his thighs, likely will not by themselves justify the use of a 
Taser.170  Finally, police will not likely be able to use Tasers on 
non-resisting individuals.171   
In light of the recent media attention to police officers’ use of 
excessive Taser force, this decision should effectively set up strict 
guidelines for when police may use Tasers.  Now that Tasers are 
clearly considered an intermediate quantum of force within the 
Ninth Circuit, their use can be justified only by a strong 
governmental interest.  For cities within the Ninth Circuit’s 
jurisdiction with Taser policies already in place, Bryan and its 
progeny will likely compel a wholesale review of those policies.  
For a city such as San Francisco, which does not currently have a 
Taser usage policy,172 it will need to shape its policy within the 
parameters established by Bryan.  In addition, law-enforcement 
agencies will likely provide more training to officers on the proper 
use of Tasers to help reduce the number of Taser-related injuries 
and fatalities and to minimize government and individual officer 
liabilities. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Bryan, the Ninth Circuit made clear that the use of a Taser 
presents an intermediate use of force that is not justified unless 
there is a strong governmental interest at stake.  The 
circumstances of this case indicated that, although Bryan was 
acting in a bizarre manner, he was not a threat to Officer 
McPherson or anyone else, and the intermediate use of force of 
the Taser was unconstitutionally excessive.  Recent negative 
media attention related to law enforcement’s improper use of 
Tasers has brought to light the tragic effect on victims, the costs to 
 
dart and drive-stun modes, the distinction played no role in the court’s excessive force 
analysis.” Id. (Berzon, J., dissenting) (citing to Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491 
(8th Cir. 2009)).  This “split” within the Ninth Circuit could lead to an en banc review of the 
Ninth Circuit’s excessive-force analysis as applied to the various uses of a Taser. 
 169 See Bryan, 590 F.3d at 777. 
 170 See Id. at 776. 
 171 See Id. at 779. 
 172 Jaxon Van Derbeken, Gascón Presses Case for Tasers, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 25, 
2010, at C-1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/02/24/BAVO1C6J7D.DTL. 
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the justice system, and other detrimental externalities.  Bryan 
should provide the legal framework and the necessary incentive to 
diminish, if not completely eliminate, improper police use of 
Tasers. 
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